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Antecedents of Islamic Political
Radicalism Among Muslim
Communities in Europe
R ecent years have witnessed a rapid prolifera-tion of radical Islamist activity in western
Europe, from MI5’s claim in 2006 of 30 incipi-
ent “terror plots” and 1,600 individuals under
surveillance, to actual terrorist atrocities in Eu-
ropean cities, the most infamous and deadly of
which included the transport network bombings
in Madrid in 2003 and in London in 2005. Con-
comitantly, both the media and the wider social
discourse have been rife with self-appointed
punditry and a plethora of commentators pontif-
icating on European radical Islam’s putative
causal factors and remedies. This paper will
attempt to address the complex issues by pro-
viding a fuller, more nuanced understanding of
some of the causes and antecedents of Islamic
political radicalism among western European
Muslims.
The Role of Religion
A cursory reading of the biographies of
many of the individuals implicated in terrorist




ing in terrorism is
somehow inextricably
linked to, or perhaps
even contingent upon, the complex phenom-
enon of sudden or increasing religiosity. This
in no way infers that an intensification in reli-
gious praxis or sentiment somehow results in a
predilection for extremism and violence.
Rather, the crux of the problem appears to lie
with the misappropriation of religious labels
for violent ends, which in itself is neither new
nor confined to the Islamic tradition. Neverthe-
less, these are rendered moot points, for what-
ever the theological justification behind such
actions ~or perhaps a lack thereof ! it remains
an indelible sociological fact that these individ-
uals considered themselves to be “true Mus-
lims,” and indeed Islam provided part of the
raison d’etre for their acts of terrorism.
The growth of religiosity, along with its con-
comitants, can perhaps be better understood
within the broad interpretational framework of
Transitional Religiosity Experiences ~TRE!,
which encompasses five key motifs, namely
adoption, intensification, transition, attenuation,
and defection. In light of our current ambit, we
will focus principally upon those motifs that
signal a heightened state of religiosity, namely:
~1! intensification—transitions from a state of
nominal or moderate to strong~er! adherence,
commitment, or affiliation within the same reli-
gious tradition, e.g., those individuals who un-
dergo born again experiences, or simply become
more “practicing” as the process is referred to in
the contemporary British Muslim idiom; and ~2!
adoption or transition—a move from no tradi-
tion or one tradition to another, e.g., conversion
to Islam, or conversion within Islam ~denomina-
tional switching—a move from one branch, sect
or school to another!. The change undergone
may be sudden, entailing the contentious phe-
nomenon of “snapping” or sudden personality
change, identified by Conway and Siegelman’s
~1978! seminal study, but has a far greater pro-
pensity to be gradual, becoming manifest over
prolonged periods of time ~Buckser and Glazier
2003!. These experiences are not necessarily
mutually exclusive, and individuals may un-
dergo multiple TREs throughout their lives, as
is illustrated by the examples of Asif Hanif and
Sajid Badat ~Dodd et al. 2003; Johnson et al.
2003!. Both cases reveal an initial, fairly grad-
ual intensification experience during adoles-
cence or early adulthood, which was then
followed some years later by a secondary, quite
sudden transition experience that resulted in or
led to radicalization. This tentative pattern may
in fact explicate the ubiquitous lag phase wit-
nessed between a rise in religiosity and the
manifestation of radical Islamist inclinations. To
put it another way, increasing religiosity per se,
particularly through intensification experiences,
is unlikely to result in radicalization and often
requires some further catalyst such as an abrupt
transition experience.
The immediate consequences of TREs can be
highly significant to the issue of potential radi-
calization, and relate principally to the two pri-
mary ways in which individuals choose to
~re!construct their life narratives following the
experience. The first paradigm does not engage
in any level of polarization between the pre and
post TRE phases of life; such cases maintain
contextual continuity. Indeed, individuals adopt-
ing this viewpoint often fail to differentiate be-
tween life phases, choosing instead to view both
as belonging to a continuum in which events
transpire without fundamentally fracturing the
overall life story. Although this first paradigm
typically accounts for the vast majority of TREs
in general, it is curiously absent from the expe-
riences of radical Islamists and so of little rele-
vance to our present study. Conversely, the
second paradigm employs the TRE as a pivotal
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harsh dichotomy between the two life-phases, a process I refer to
as contextual bifurcation. The past life and all that it entailed is
now diametrically opposed to the present life. Indeed, the more
severe the distinction between the two phases, the more likely the
individual will be to consider the change wrought to be genuine
and meaningful. Often the individual’s recollection of pre-TRE
life is marked by confusion and crisis that is then seemingly re-
solved through acceptance of a totalitarian vision of Islam, a sys-
tem of unflinching moral absolutes. Indeed, anything that fails to
conform to this perceived moral clarity ~including other Islamic
viewpoints! is to be shunned and condemned, and this perspec-
tive is facilitated by an almost Manichean separation of reality
into good and evil, represented by the Islamic concepts of halal
and haram respectively. This view is also typically characterized
by the severing ~or at least weakening! of familial and social net-
works, though the disavowal of parents, siblings, wives, and chil-
dren, which also signifies a break with the past.
Antecedents of TREs
TREs do not occur in complete vacua, and in addition to sub-
stantive spiritual desires, yearnings, and experiences, are as
much a product of ambient social, cultural, and political mi-
lieux, which therefore also need to be accorded credence as fac-
tors that are integral to this process. Consequently, a holistic
understanding of the antecedents of TREs is central to the study.
There are numerous extraneous factors that can lead to a pre-
disposition for TREs. Diverse socio-economic factors are most
often-cited and typically include high levels of unemployment,
poor job prospects, low educational attainment, a disproportion-
ately high prison population, and poor housing facilities, com-
pounded by the presence of endemic and often institutionalized
racism and Islamophobia ~Office for National Statistics 2003;
Trades Union Congress 2005; Peach 2004; Strategy Unit 2003;
Department for Education and Skills 2003; European Monitor-
ing Centre on Racism and Xenophobia 2003!. Indeed many of
the biographies of radical Islamists point to an ambience of
socio-economic deprivation. Some have suggested that terrorist
acts can be viewed as an extreme variant of violent urban pro-
test,1 being deeply-rooted in years of cumulative deprivation,
marginalization, and grievances against the British state ~Farrar
2005!. The joint report produced by the FCO and Home Office
~2004! corroborates this finding by suggesting that the poor and
jobless are considered to be particularly susceptible to exploita-
tion and recruitment by extremists. Similarly, criminal activity
also appears to be associated with a significant proportion of
Islamists prior to their radicalization. Radicals such as Richard
Reid, Mukhtar Said Ibrahim, and Mohammed Bouyeri are all
thought to have developed strong Islamist views while in prison,
which may suggest that the espousal of violent Jihadism may in
fact constitute a form of recidivism that supplants more conven-
tional modes of criminality.
Despite the presence of very real socio-economic deprivation
in many of the areas from which radical Islamists hail, we must
nevertheless contend with the striking incongruity that a signifi-
cant proportion of these individuals were not particularly de-
prived or marginalized. Indeed, some attended private schools,
were university graduates or working professionals. However,
by focusing on individual circumstances and achievements, we
not only do a great disservice to the genuinely impoverished
communities from which they hailed, and which held a pro-
found resonance for them, but we also fail to apprehend the
communal nature of radical-Islamist discourse. Khan, in his
posthumously released “martyrdom” testament, repeatedly in-
vokes a communal identity in which he identifies the subjuga-
tion of “my people” and “my Muslim brothers and sisters” as
being principle among his grievances.
Instead the one unifying thread among all these narratives is
not necessarily poverty, but the complete divorce between all of
these men and conventional political processes ~Farrar 2005!.
Young Muslims can often experience a twofold disaffection, in
which they experience exclusion from both mainstream politics
and society, and from minority community politics ~as alluded
to later!. Political impotence, such as that witnessed in the wake
of unprecedented anti-war marches and demonstrations that nev-
ertheless failed to avert the course of the Iraq war, can lead to
disillusionment with democratic principles and processes,2 as is
illustrated by the examples of Hussain Osman or Mohammed
Bouyeri. Potentially, this may result in a retreat to Islamism as
advocated by groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, who decry the no-
tion of democracy and positively reveled in the failure of con-
ventional political activism in preventing the Iraq war.3
Identity Construction
One particularly significant antecedent of TREs appears to be
the presence of unresolved issues vis-à-vis identity construction.
For radical Islamists, the most salient elements of this contested
identity construction may be considered to equate to the abstrac-
tions of majority culture ~mainstream or host society!, minority
culture ~ethnic or parental!, and religion. Admittedly, this facile
demarcation is in many ways specious, for none of these ele-
ments are diametrically opposed to one another, and there is
considerable interaction and overlap between their spheres of
influence. Nevertheless, and despite the fact that they may sim-
ply reinforce the validity of a Tebbit test or its trite post 707
equivalent, “are you British or Muslim?” iterated ad nauseam in
the media recently, they do offer a convenient means of ap-
proaching the subject.
Minority Culture
For converts, the notion of an ethnic or minority culture may
appear paradoxical, and although some converts may view pa-
rental culture in highly parochial terms that renders it discern-
ible from a more general notion of mainstream culture, the vast
majority will perceive an inevitable conflation between majority
and minority cultures, rendering the latter term somewhat redun-
dant. Conversely, minority culture has a far greater bearing upon
identity constructions in the experiences of first generation mi-
grants, for whom it occupies the position of majority culture
prior to their migration. Their sentiments vis-à-vis minority cul-
ture are largely contingent upon the degree and duration of em-
bedment within the said culture prior to displacement, and the
underlying reasons for that displacement, i.e., whether or not the
dislocation was voluntary. Subsequent to their displacement,
their experiences often mirror those of the final grouping.
Second and subsequent generation members of migrant com-
munities are much more ambivalent towards the notion of a mi-
nority culture. Those who choose to affirm its validity can do so
in one of two main ways; they may construe their ethnic culture
as a symbol of political mobilization and belonging ~Song
2003!. Others, however, retain identifications with parental cul-
ture through the atavistic expression of ethnic cultural compo-
nents such as language, cuisine, dress, or music. However, even
in cases where individuals attempt a nostalgic reconciliation
with their roots, it typically entails the adoption of a distinc-
tively diasporic expression of that culture ~such as Asian hip-
hop or Bhangra music!, which may not necessarily be deemed
authentic, nor grant cultural legitimacy.
However, the predominant paradigm for radical Islamists by
far appears to be the staunch repudiation of one’s minority cul-
ture and can occur for a variety of reasons. Individuals may
deem the community and culture associated with parents to have
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exerted a serious stultifying effect on their aspirations and pros-
pects for the future. Consequently, a sense of powerlessness and
a lack of self-determinism may ensue, which the individual per-
ceives to be the result of excessively moralizing influences, over-
bearing familial control, and conservative social and sexual
mores, which combined with inflated parental expectations and
an unattainable study or work ethic, seek to stifle creativity, ex-
perimentation, and freedom of choice. The problem may be com-
pounded further by the presence of tribal or clan-based power
structures, epitomized by the South Asian biraderi and commen-
surable systems in other cultures, which can have the ostensive
effect of divesting youth of any real tangible control over their
own lives. The socio-political impotence that may be imposed by
the biraderi was poignantly illustrated by the Labour “postal vot-
ing” fraud in Birmingham in the 2003 elections ~Kennedy 2005;
Akhtar 2003!. A slew of reports following the “race riots” of
2001 in Oldham, Burnley, and Bradford, primarily involving
young British Muslim men of South Asian descent, all drew at-
tention to precisely this sort of cumulative marginalization of
youth voices by decision-makers and community leaders ~Cantle
2001; Clarke 2002; Ouseley 2002; Ritchie 2001; Denham 2002!.
More recently, the Home Office Report ~2005! Preventing Ex-
tremism Together Working Groups, precipitated by the events of
July 2005, also arrived at a similar conclusion.
The loss of minority culture may also correlate to a profound
sense of alienation from one’s family and is often precipitated
by a breakdown in communication, particularly with parents,
who are therefore unlikely to be made privy to issues of utmost
importance in their children’s lives. Indeed, in the numerous
cases presented before us, none of the families appear to have
been cognizant of the paths upon which their children were em-
barked, and for many, the disavowal of their children’s actions
were preceded initially by vociferous doubts over their culpabil-
ity, evincing a state of profound shock and denial.
One of the charges routinely leveled at minority culture by
radical Islamists is that the traditions and customs associated
with it seek to adulterate their pristine vision of Islam. This is
hardly surprising, considering that prior to their TREs most in-
dividuals possess only a rudimentary grasp of their parental
faith, which rarely extends to religious praxis of any sort. Con-
sequently, when they do begin to tentatively explore their
religious heritage, the discovery of “extraneous” material inter-
jected into the Islamic canon can appear as something of a rev-
elation, providing them with an authentic vehicle to forge an
alternative Islamic identity to that bequeathed by parents ~Lewis
1994; Roy 2004!. The growing attraction of an austere Wah-
habism or Salafism among diasporic Muslim youth that con-
demns many ethnic customs and norms as bidah ~reprehensive
religious innovation! is testament to this fact.
But perhaps the most damning indictment of minority culture
for many radical Islamists is that it holds little or no relevance
in the diaspora. There is no “myth of return,” no solace to be
found in a nostalgic struggle for the homeland ~or it is at least
reframed in supra-national terms that renders its parochialism
anachronistic!, and ethnic languages become defunct through
neglect while English assumes the role of lingua franca. More-
over, ambient cultural racism ~Modood 2005! serves to negate
any intrinsic worth thought to reside in ethnic traditions and
customs, while concomitantly those very same traditions and
customs are exposed as subverting authentic Islam. By virtue of
this two-pronged attack, minority culture can effectively become
obsolete.
Majority Culture
One of the more striking aspects of radical Islamism in the
West is the degree to which its proponents are often ensconced
within the majority culture prior to their radicalization. Indeed
biographies of many radical Islamists are rife with details allud-
ing to an espousal of secular, Western lifestyles that are wholly
appropriated from the host culture. Not only does the espousal
of majority identities appear to be the norm, but often include
elements that are anathema to their own minority cultural expec-
tations and norms. Enculturation of this sort is perhaps to be
expected of converts and second or subsequent generation Brit-
ish Muslims who, by virtue of being raised in a pervasively
British environment, imbibe many of its values and cultural
norms. However, even the more recent arrivals appear to have
displayed a remarkably rapid embedment in majority culture.
The portrait then of many radical Islamists prior to their radi-
calization is one of comfortable immersion in popular, main-
stream youth culture and laxity in religious praxis, but also,
critically, retention of some vestige of minority cultural and reli-
gious identity. At best, such examples illustrate that an individ-
ual is particularly adept at traversing cultural spheres, however,
at other times and points in the individual’s life ~such as those
induced by crisis, or changes in circumstances or commitment!,
it may also point to a cultural schizophrenia of sorts that cannot
reasonably be sustained for any prolonged period of time. Iden-
tity is not a static construction and as self-categorization theory
contends ~Oakes et al. 1994; Turner et al. 1987!. The self may
be defined at different levels of abstraction depending upon dif-
fering circumstances; at times it may be in terms of individual
uniqueness, while at others, in terms of specific group member-
ship. The salience of a communal identity may, for example,
arise during periods of perceived group crisis, evoked by events
such as the Iraq war, the Palestinian Intifada, or the global war
on terrorism. It is in these instances that individuals become
more prone to reassessing what religious identity means to
them, either as reconstruction in part of the lost minority iden-
tity or as a response to pressing questions and challenges from a
pervasively non-Muslim environment. Moreover, this new inter-
est in religion may also stem from a gradual disillusionment
with majority culture, particularly in light of its perceived hedo-
nism, rampant capitalism, and the general imposition of con-
flicting core value-systems from the host society, which may
render the individual unwilling or unable to perpetuate assimila-
tion into the predominant paradigm.
This leaves the individual in something of a quandary; a dis-
tinct lack of identification with both minority and majority cul-
tures, as a result of being unable or unwilling to fulfill either
group’s normative expectations, gives rise to a dual cultural al-
terity. In the absence of an appealing cultural paradigm from
either group, the individual simply resorts to a cultural en-
trenchment that assumes a religious hue by default ~due to a
lack of viable alternatives!, thus transforming religion from reli-
gion per se into an anchor of identity. Consequently, religion not
only provides an emphatic rejoinder to Western identity, but is
also interpreted de novo, without the perceived cultural accre-
tions of the Islam associated with their parental or ethnic iden-
tity, thereby constructing a legitimate identity outside both
minority and majority cultures.
Antecedents of Radicalization
As indicated earlier, TREs, including those that occur sud-
denly and entail contextual disjuncture of some form, do not
imply, ipso facto, the presence of radical Islamist proclivities.
Some individuals may even be drawn to the austere, puritanical
forms of Salafism or Wahhabism ~that provide the principle
ideological basis for global jihadism!, but nevertheless eschew
violence of any form themselves. Clearly something beyond a
simple TRE must transpire if an individual is to be drawn to
radical Islamism. How then does one progress from a TRE to
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Islamo-jihadist inclinations? A number of factors appear to be
instrumental to this process.
A recent survey of Muslim students ~FOSIS 2005! found that
83% were unhappy with British foreign policy, principally in
Iraq, Israel0Palestine, Afghanistan, and the alliance with the
U.S.—all areas in which Muslims are perceived to be the vic-
tims of Western aggression and persecution. Within such a
widespread sea of discontent, the presence of a small minority
who may countenance the articulation of that discontent through
violent means is eminently plausible. For these putative latent
radicals, any new perceived provocation, such as the occupation
of Iraq, or the lurid excesses witnessed at Guantanamo Bay or
Abu Ghraib, may serve as a casus belli that sanctions the re-
course to jihadism. The International Institute of Strategic Stud-
ies ~2004! in its Strategic Survey 2003/4 reported that the Iraq
conflict had resulted in an acceleration of recruitment with up to
1,000 foreign jihadists having infiltrated Iraq, highlighting the
role of political events in the incubation and catalysis of
radicalism.
One of the potential consequences of socio-economic depri-
vation, political disaffection, and the gradual lack of identifica-
tion with minority and majority cultures referred to earlier, is
the manifestation of a state of anomie. This absence of values
and standards, with the concomitant feelings of alienation and
purposelessness, are not necessarily alleviated by the recourse to
TREs. Instead, the individual turns to the espousal of radical
Islamism, which serves as an emphatic rejoinder to the banality
and inane humdrum of daily life. In its stead, this new world-
view provides, perhaps for the first time, a sense of being part
of an elite group that compensates for the shortcomings of one’s
own petty existence. Moreover, sacralized violence and ulti-
mately martyrdom provide a conduit for these otherwise seem-
ingly implacable feelings of dejection, with the individual
spurred on by the vainglory of being included among the alumni
of the shuhada¯ ~martyrs!.
Given the amorphous and egalitarian nature of Islamic eccle-
siastical structures and the fluidity of its jurisprudence, the con-
spicuous absence of a clearly delineated religious hierarchy can
also pose a serious problem ~Hefner 2005!. The problem is fur-
ther compounded by the fact that the traditional ulama ~religious
scholars! are no longer considered to be the ultimate repositories
for moral authority and guidance they once were. With the ad-
vent of globalization and an age of virtual fatwas,4 it can prove
increasingly more difficult for the uninitiated to discern the au-
thentic and eminently trustworthy from those who are not. It is
in this context that we should seek to understand Shahzad Tan-
weer’s adulation of Osama bin Laden, whom he considered to be
“his personal hero” ~McGrory and Hussain 2005!. It is easy to
understand why a figure like bin Laden, who strikes a compel-
ling pose as the classic warrior-cleric, is considered eminently
more trustworthy, more genuine, more rightly-guided than
“mainstream” scholars, is perceived to be corrupted by complic-
ity with and subservience to secular or despotic regimes. Indeed,
his pariah status grants him autonomy from the political machi-
nations, internecine conflicts and worldly affairs within which
mainstream scholars are seen to be embroiled, granting him a
potent legitimacy not based on scholarly erudition. This very
same process that equates dissidence ~against the state, Western
hegemony, or secularism! with probity also grants legitimacy to
notorious fringe scholars in Britain such as Omar Bakri Moham-
med, Abu Hamza al-Masri, and Abu Qatada, who have been in-
strumental in at least some of the radicalizations witnessed.
Far more important than fringe scholars, is the self-
radicalizing efficacy of the Internet, particularly on the growing
phenomenon of jihadist web sites, forums, and blogs that provide
not only the ideological treatises, and theological “evidences”
underpinning the culture of jihad, but also the means through
which to carry it out. For a comprehensive account of the role of
virtual jihadist media in radicalization, see Awan ~2007!.
One of the oft-overlooked aspects of radical Islamism is the
degree to which humanistic aspirations underlie the changes in
worldview associated with incipient radicalism. Empathy for
fellow Muslims inculcate many potential radical Islamists with a
sense of duty and justice, which finds effective expression
through the conduit of jihadism. According to interrogators,
would-be suicide bombers are always sincerely compassionate
to those they see themselves as helping ~Atran 2004!—a point
corroborated by Durkheim’s sociological taxonomy of suicide,
through which “martyrdom operations” are also considered to
be altruistic in nature ~Durkheim 1897; Stack 2004!. Pape’s
~2005! comprehensive study of suicide-terrorism reveals that
suicide bombings are virtually always a liberation strategy in
response to occupation that places the community over and
above the self; that is why the occupied communities often call
them martyrs and consider their actions to be altruistic.5 The
notion of community here is expanded beyond its traditional
ambit to that of the Ummah ~the global community of believ-
ers!, which is central to Islamist discourse, and indeed, the
Islamo-jihadist movement’s actions and rhetoric constantly, and
rather shrewdly, invoke the specter of a global community.
It is easy to conflate all jihadist acts and actions under the
singular rubric of terrorism, however, even among radical Islam-
ists themselves there exist degrees of acceptability ~see Haykel
2005!. Causes associated with national struggles for indepen-
dence against repressive regimes, such as those of Chechnya,
Kashmir, and Palestine enjoy widespread sympathy and conse-
quently have far greater legitimacy than for example, khilafah
movements or the global jihadism of al-Qaeda. In the same way,
conflict with military occupiers is not accorded the same invio-
lable taboo status as violence against civilian populations. It
appears that many potential radicals, with romanticized and ear-
nest, but largely inchoate notions of defending the Ummah and
championing the cause of the oppressed, can have their ~often
laudable! empathies diverted ~due to a lack of accessibility to
the principle cause! or manipulated to deadly effect. They may
not wish to participate in more controversial operations, how-
ever, by that point they have long crossed the Rubicon.
In other scenarios, there may be a gradual progression to
increasingly more hardline radicalism that transcends the
individual’s initial largely humanistic aspirations. The small
number of Britons who struck out to join the Iraqi insurgency
~Leiken and Brooke 2005!, which is viewed as a legitimate
movement against Western occupation, just as earlier British
Jihadists traveled to the theatres of conflict in Chechnya, Kash-
mir, Afghanistan, and Bosnia before them ~Taarnby 2004!, will
inevitably return to their host societies. These survivors, brutal-
ized by the ravages of war and possibly suffering from post-
traumatic stress disorder, may prove incapable of slipping back
into mainstream society, and consequently may more easily re-
sort to more extreme or taboo modes of violence.
The paths and motivations then to Islamic political radicalism
among British Muslims are many and varied, with no simple
cause and effect calculus appearing to be tenable. Rather, socio-
economic deprivation and political disaffection potently com-
bined with the dual cultural alterity experienced by diasporic
Muslims, can lead to an entrenchment that takes on a religious
hue by default. In light of this deculturation, identification and
loyalty is transferred from the majority and minority cultures to
the Ummah exclusively. In times of group crisis ~such as that
imposed by perceived Western aggression!, humanistic aspira-
tions and a state of anomie may compel the individual to under-
take altruistic violence in the hope of liberating his community
~Ummah!, and himself ~from a banal existence!, through his
own sacrifice.
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Notes
1. Such as the “race riots” of 2001 in Oldham, Burnley, and Bradford,
or the more recent disturbances involving French youth in Paris and Lyon.
2. Conversely, the potent efficacy of the Madrid bombings in precipitat-
ing the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq serves to legitimize alternate
means.
3. Hizb ut-Tahrir ran an intensive campaign in the run-up to the Inva-
sion of Iraq, employing the slogan “Don’t Stop the War—Except through
Islamic Politics.” See www.khilafah.com0home0category. php?DocumentID
6108&TagID28.
4. A number of Islamic web sites offer online fatwa databases and the
provision of Q&A fatwa sessions. See for example www.islam-qa.com and
www.islamonline.net0English0index.shtml. See also Gary Bunt ~2003!.
5. The large number of U.S. troops stationed in the Arabian Gulf, par-
ticularly in the hijaz, was seen as occupation by al-Qaeda and their support-
ers, and indeed their removal constituted the earliest articulated demand by
Osama bin Laden. See, “The Ladinese Epistle: Declaration of War ~I!,”
MSANEWS and “Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the
Land of the Two Holy Places.”
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